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Crystal Gateway Marriott Hotel
Arlington, Virginia
October 20, 1989
12:30 P.M.

Before presenting my views on a somewhat controversial
subject in the field of intellectual property, I would like to
share with you some thoughts on the communication crisis in the
legal profession.
If communication is defined as expression that is clearly
and easily understood, much of the written and oral expression of
the legal profession simply fails to measure up to the
definition.

Inability to communicate afflicts all segments of

the profession and is now pervasive enough to be classified as a
crisis.

It deserves ,your attention because the effective

transmission of information, thoughts, ideas and knowledge is
just as essential to the efficient operation of our legal system
as it is to progress in the arts and sciences.
expression in

leg~! ~iscou~se

Ineffective

diminishes the service of the bar,

impedes the resolution of disputes, retards legal progress and
growth and, ultimately, undermines the rule of law.

The

expressive deficiencies of lawyers must be recognized as a
serious and growing problem.

The problem does not seem to be as

widespread among the members of the Intellectual Property Bar.
Perhaps that is because of the nature of your work.

This is not

to say that communication problems are entirely unknown among
you, however.

In one sense, the legal profession merely reflects a
communication crisis in the society at large.
by doubletalk.

We are surrounded

Consider these examples, collected from recent

newspaper reports:
Doctors at a Philadelphia hospital described a patient's
death as a "diagnostic misadventure of a high magnitude .. "
Five thousand workers at a Chrysler plant found out that a
new "career alternative enhancement program" meant their plant
was closing and they were out of jobs.
A stockbroker described the October 13th stock market crash
as a "fourth quarter equity retreat."
A United States Senator referred to capital punishment as
"our society's recognition of the sanctity of human life."
What I do not understand is why lawyers tolerate doubletalk
and inarticulateness in speech and writing.

Twenty years ago,

the National District Attorneys Association, of which I was then
a member, held its annual conference in New York City.

During

the conference, we had a luncheon speaker who was introduced as a
member of the United Nations legal staff specializing in criminal
matters.
artist~

I

recognized him as a local comedian and doubletalk

About ten minutes into his meaningless spiel, a

prosecutor from Georgia sitting next to me leaned over and said:
"Ah cain't understand a lot of what thet ol' boy is sayin'."
replied:

I

"You can't understand anything of what he is saying,

because he is speakii:g doubletalk."

"Isn't that somethin'?" he

said, "Ah just tho't he had a real bad New York accent."
2

Consider these facts: failure to communicate is near the top
of the list of complaints made by clients about their lawyers.
Law firms have begun to hire public relations counsel to speak to
the public for them and to advise them on how to communicate with
the press.

The employers of newly admitted lawyers have found it

necessary to provide them with teachers of English grammar, style
and usage.

Lawyer-to-lawyer and lawyer-to-client communication

often is incomprehensible.

Lawyer communication in the trial

courtroom frequently is silly, and I am here to tell you that
appellate

occasion_~~·- just

exchanges that
in

Q.
A.

Q.

Doctor, did you say he was shot in the woods?
No, I said he was shot in the lumbar region.

A.
Q.

Now, Mrs. Johnson, how was your first marriage
terminated?
By death.
And by whose death was it terminated?

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

What is your name?
Ernestine McDowell.
And what is your marital status?
Fair.

Q.
A.

What happened then?
He told me, he says, "I have to kill you because
you can identify me."
Did he kill you?
No.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.

Are you married?
No, I am divorced.
What did your husband do before you divorced him?
A lot of things that I didn't know about.
At the time you first saw Dr. McCarty, had you ever
seen him prior to that time?
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Q.
A.

Q.
A.
Q.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A..

Now I am going to show you what has been marked as
~~'ax:e:=s Exhibit No. 2 and ask if you recognize the
picture.
John Fletcher.
That's you?
Yes, sir.
And you were present when the picture was taken,
right?
Mr. Jones, is your appearance this morning pursuant
to a deposition notice which I sent to your
attorney?
No.
This is how I dress when I go to work.
And lastly, Gary, all your responses must be oral.
Okay? What school do you go to?
Oral.
How old are you?
Oral.

As for appellate advocacy, it is the rare briefwriter, in my
experience, who seizes the opportunity to employ the clarity,
simplicity and directness of expression necessary to endow a
brief with maximum persuasive force.

I often think of the pro se

litigant who referred to himself throughout his brief and in his
oral argument before us as "your despondent."

He was the

petitioner, actually, and we were despondent.

I bring this

message on communications to you as a matter of self-defense.

I

hope that it will encourage those of you who brief and argue
appeals to bear in mind that your object is persuasion and your
only means to achieve that goal is communication.
I turn now to my proposal for a change in the law of fair
use.

Regardless of what I would like to law to be, I am bound by

statute and precedent to apply the law as it is.
should not be taken in any other way.
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My remarks

EXPLOITING STOLEN TEXT:

FAIR USE OR FOUL PLAY?*

Roger J. Miner**

The doctrine of fair use in copyright law presently permits
the exploitation of unpublished, copyrighted text stolen from an
author or one in lawful possession.

This anomaly in the law is a

creature of the Copyright Act 1 and should be eliminated by
appropriate statutory amendment.

The outright theft of

intellectual property ought not to be condoned by Congress.

In

any case where an author has not published or publicly
disseminated his or her copyrighted material, there simply is no
reason to allow the use of that material without the author's
consent.
In his Commentaries on the Laws of England, Sir William
Blackstone described the rights of authors in their original
compositions as a "species of property grounded in labour and
invention." 2

The rule in 1766 England, according to Blackstone,

was that
[w]hen a man by the exertion of his
rational powers has produced an
original work, he has clearly a
right to dispose of that identical
work as he pleases, and any attempt
to take it from him, or vary the
disposition he has made of it, is
an invasi~n of his right of
property.
Copyright was recognized in the common law as well as by the
Statute of Anne, 4 which, according to Blackstone, provided

"additional penalties 115 to protect the property of authors and
their assigns for a term of years.
(.;.~~1..a,,a;~~~¥-··~~~.ew~'1r·~~~r·""~··iliiF~t--Yl!iil~·"l!fi"i1:~@:1'ls··'·····1:!>~~"fr'1t·f'.>·:t~·1'.·n.·et····
j

·the.,invas ion·<::>f ···authors '

propert:·y·. ··r.i:·ghts,,. ..~. · . J:;t;,.,•. ii·S····· inte:i:::esting to note that Blacks tone. 1 in.
. examining. . the ."law. o.f.1.arceny.,. found that ''w:hen property
any violation ef· that property is subjeet ·to

be punished by the laws of society.~,]
The right to make some reasonable use of published,
copyrighted material long has been recognized in the English
cases.

"Fair abridgement," as it then was called, was permitted

early on, despite the difficulties experienced by courts in
coping with the concept. 8

However, the common law rights of

authors to control first publication always were considered
separate and distinct from any rules pertaining to statutory

autho;r;..... o . £ .. ·unpublished compositions, which· depend entixely upan

2

In the United States, Congress first exercised its
constitutional authority to "secur[e] for limited Times to
Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 1110
when it enacted the first copyright statute in 1790. 11

In Folsom

v. Marsh, 12 Justice Story formulated the first definitive
statement on fair use in Americ

l,e.t.te;,;.g..M·•e£.,··Gee:t:ge,,.washi·n~1'.;;eft'·"··4:·a'" a .... two.,.,.v.o,1··\::lmew··WO·ti:;:·k""'•·G>ft····W.ashington
.wr.~:t..e.~···by"··Re:v; .•."Char l
;t,welll~.:Jlolume.

es···· Upham·it ··· The·1"•l·e·~·t·e·r·s ·WElre. . . c O·pie·d>·f·rem" ·the

work..of .. Ja.red. Sp.arks."" who· orig·inally edi ted 1 1

,copy,righted and ··published them.

Sparks· and Chief Justice

Mars.har1·1· had· obta·i·ned the letters.. from..,,JusJ:.iceh. . .~~·shrod·
"',.W»a~,.bing:to.n..,,h.nephew·····of·

·the""····f·irs·t····president..

In his opinion,

Just.ice .story discussed the justifiaale . use.s .of . . c.opyrighted works
a-a.G-~lz.e.~-··~-~e~·~·-·~··+·~co.ns~,,,..~~"'de..t.e~i:·rt±·ng"""
whe~fl:e~~·"6·he•~···h~··bee.n.,,..al1r···.in"~·~in(:jement"'r"'''''Thos·&···"i!ae·'t;;or·s····--····t·};;}.e

natu.t:,e,_,and,.,.. ab'3,eet,&.,··&,:f!··~'E~h:e·.,,·se1eG.t.ions ... made·r·"·4:.,,hs.,.."!a.ant: i:t:y"'·and···vai·uie
1

·o.£.....the.H...materials. usecl:·,~·and··the· de<3ree· in·which the· use· may ..
pr:e.~di,~.e. .'··t.he.,..sa1er·Olr·

diminish,...·the··prefit:s..1···or ·supersede ·the

S·fi>jec.ts.. o:f,, the original wo,rk:.1J ,.... _ were to be echoed in the

Copyright Act of 1976. 14
The distinction between common law and statutory copyright
protection was carried over to American law from the law of
England. 15

Common law copyright attached to a work from creation

3

to publication or dissemination, and was enforceable in the state
courts.

16

As was true under British law, the defense of fair use

was not considered applicable to unpublished material. 17
1976 Copyright Act changed all that.

Or so it seemed.

The
Common

law copyright, often referred to as the right of first
publication, was preempted by the new statute.

18

The doctrine of

fair use was codified and made applicable for the first time to
all copyrighted work, published and unpublished, without
distinction.
work . .

According to the Act, "fair use of a copyrighted

. for purposes such as criticism, comment, news

reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright. " 19

In determining whether the use

made of a work in a particular case is fair, courts are
constrained to consider four factors:

purpose and character of

the use; nature of the copyrighted work; amount and
substantiality of the portion used; and effect of the use on the
potential market for the copyrighted work. 20
A persuasive case is made in the leading treatise on fair
use for the proposition "that Congress intended to continue the
common law prohibition against fair use of unpublished but not
voluntarily disseminated works. " 21

There is, of course, no

specific statutory language supporting the proposition, which is
founded in a review of the legislative history of the 1976 Act.
The legislative history referred to is derived from the reports

4

of several committees of Congress, including one expressing a
congressional intent to "restate the present judicial doctrine of
fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way.

11

22

The treatise refers to this and other evidence as providing
support for the notion that the fair use doctrine is intended to
apply only to unpublished works that are publicly disseminated,
the same as at common law.

23

Apparently, public dissemination is

thought to involve a deliberate choice to make a work available
to others, short of actual publication.

The public performance

of unpublished plays and an author's delivery of an unpublished
manuscript to a critic are given as examples of voluntary
dissemination.

24

Publication is defined by statute as "the

distribution of copies . . . of a work to the public" as well as
"[t]he offering to distribute copies . . . to a group of persons
for purposes of further distribution, public performance, or
pub 1 ic dis p 1 ay . . . .
dc:)eS'"d··not··· of'

"'·~·l.,i.G,•ype~~~~ma:fte•ec.!'

orm·dispJ:ay·"•'O''.E"•<•a,·wo:r**

its e1 :f constitute pub lie a:"'tion··i'·. it.~"~···· ······T.he" distinc-tier:b

:Between ·publicatien and public disseminat:ion· .i:s·· ve·r'Y'/ slight
in dee&~·""

In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 26
the Supreme Court was presented with a clear opportunity to
eliminate unpublished works from the reach of fair use.

That it

did not do so was attributable solely to the language of the
Copyright Act.

Unquestioned in Harper & Row was the trial

5

court's finding that the defendant "knowingly exploited a
purloined manuscript." 27

The manuscript in question was, of

course, the memoirs of President Ford.
we~e,,.,scheduled

to ... appea.r

Time magazine one week before the

book was to be distributed by the plainti
pubLL.shing house.

Before either scheduled event transpired,

.aimple theft allowed the defendant to print and distribute the
wox:d,s._.ct£,President Ford, describing the pardon of Richard Nixon,
.l.i H~'"·.J..,i:..~~""'i~:uoi. . a...c~ a1i:i.drEH'Jtr'·'""'"''·''':ll:'ft· r€~¥E~·r·lEY:i:·neir''''0't::·n~~"'''"'8·eet!>'RE:!.i··· 1~~rEFU·~L.:t:

Appeewl"8'·"~and··ho 1 dinq·

coa&~ded··

Cour·~·

the···· p la:int.i :f~·· en{'.;. i tleGl to·. dama geS··r· the· Court;;,..,,

"that the unpublished· nature of·· a· work is ' (a] key,

though. not necessarily determinative, factor' tending to negate·, a

defEMlS~ of fair use·':'*.!"~

Al though the Court analyzed the facts of

the case in terms of the four statutory fair use factors, it held
that "(u]nder ordinary circumstances, the author's right to
control the first public appearance of his undisseminated
expression will outweigh a claim of fair use. 1129

I suggest that

the vague and undefined phrase, "under ordinary circumstances,"
leaves open a window that should be closed by Congress.

The

window is open only because the Copyright Act presently makes no
distinction for fair use purposes between copyrighted material
that is published or disseminated and copyrighted material that
is unpublished or undisseminated.
thief may enter.

6

It is a window through which a

In the wake of Harper & Row, the courts have been faced with
some thorny problems in deciding whether various uses of
unpublished, copyrighted material were used fairly within the
intendment of the Copyright Act.

For example, in Salinger v.

Random House, Inc., 30 a case involving the copying of letters of
J.D. Salinger by a biographer who gained access to the letters by
promising not to copy them, the appeals court panel puzzled over
the "ambiguity arising from the Supreme Court's observation that
'the scope of fair use is narrower with respect to unpublished
works.'" 31

The conclusion was that the Court meant it was less

likely that fair use would apply to unpublished than published
matter, and not merely that a lesser quantity of material may be
copied in the case of unpublished matter.
RG~(iip,.~;,~!\.~"'"·a~·,.·,,·±E~clf~.t;.···.

some.of the b·i0grapher' s copying''' was· mC>tivated

by a"'' .,ds.s4:rr:e to avoid writing what he·' called· "pedestrian
2

sent:eRcefs]. " 3? If y0u can lift the word images and, stylistic
device.sof.J .• D .. Salinger., why b0ther creatring:ycmr

own~

The extensive use of an unpublished paper "purloined from
the Princeton library 1133 presented a District Judge with yet
another twist in the defense 0f fair use.

A copy 0f the paper,

dealing with the Pahlevi restoration in Iran, arrived at the
library as part of the files of Allen Dulles, to whom it was sent
by the author.

Researchers at the library were afforded notice

of possible liability for c0pyright infringement and agreed that

7

permiss
~

to reproduce was required.

,""""""'~·''~''"Mc-"'*'·V........ ~......4-11..., ..,,.,,,. ,.•..Q,o4>·'"""''""''

VJY-6.-.•••. .............

The user

claimed-~~~.~~

pa.rt··S of. the.····author's · 'l"'\.::li"l"'\t::l~·~····

:to pr.ovide his book with an '_'air of authenticity" and '.'fu·ll
He contended als.Q; that the "ordinary circumstances"
rule did not apply because the paper copied was fact rather than
fiction, the author of the paper had given copies to certain
persons, and the paper and the book were designed to serve
different purposes. 35

The district court rejected all these

contentions, applied the statutory fair use factors and found the
user liable for infringement.

An action to enjoin the publication of the biography of L.
Ron Hubbard, deceased founder of the Church of Scientology,
presented another occasion for an attempt to define further the
imprecise parameters of the doctrine of fair use as it pertains
to unpublished material.

The material was the product of the pen

of Hubbard himself, and the unpublished writings in question, a
certain diary in particular, were almost certainly acquired from
the Church of Scientology by misappropriation or conversion. 36
Although the district court ultimately decided to award damages
for infringement, it accepted the infringer's contention that
there is greater justification in using unpublished work to make
a point about the character of the work's author (as was the case
in the Hubbard biography) than to display the distinctiveness of
a writing style (as was the case in the Salinger biography).

8

In dictum, the panel majority of the appeals court found the
distinction between use to enliven text and use to communicate
certain traits of character "unnecessary and unwarranted:" the
biography clearly was a work of criticism, scholarship or
research, the purpose of use factor therefore weighed in favor
the copier, and this distinction was considered superfluous. 37

!EGunQ.~,.sJ:..gni:t,ieanee··,·i~"····t:·he-~~·ae.~... t;.ha,t.~-·,:t·h·Er····,Su·preme··Hottr·~·~···n"eve~·· ···ha>S
~p~e'S':ly·-·rej'e"eted·"··t:':he·'""''"·di·s·ti·net::·ie·n·····betwe·en"'"''·c·opy:i:fHJ.,,··e*pr.ess·ion····t"O
1··e:aJ:.i~eB~···t:her·copier'

s prose and· daing so where··

0·a··£·~.a.QGurat.e±y···and··f:ai·r·~~~J~8

necessar~,,..1;e··· re.par~

As the author of the panel

majority opinian and the opinion concurring in the denial of
rehearing in bane, I cantinue to "question whether judges, rather
than literary critics, should decide whether literary material is
used to enliven text or demonstrate truth." 39

In my opinion,

"[i]t is far too easy for one author to use another author's work
on the pretext it is copied for the latter purpase rather than
the former. 1140

The issue is not yet definit~ly resolved in the

Second Circuit because affirmance of the judgment of the district
court in the case, New Era Publications v. Henry Holt & Co., was
based on laches, rather than on the type of use to which the
converted material was put. 41
Certain elements af the intellectual property bar hold the
firm belief that the window of fair use should be opened even

9

wider than permitted by Harper & Row for access to unpublished
and undisseminated material.

These elements apparently are not

at all of fended by the notion of exploiting a manuscript pilfered
by a burglar from an author's locked desk drawer, provided the
exploitation furthers a just and worthy cause.

That federal

judges are intended to decide what causes are good and just
should be a matter of some concern.

Many critics base their

positions on First Amendment arguments.

One commentator has

written that "[t]he nature of the accomodation [sic] between
copyright principles and First Amendment principles remains to be
drafted. 1142

Yet the Supreme Court in Harper & Row noted "that

copyright's idea/expression dichotomy 'strike[s] a definitional
balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by
permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an
author's expression.'" 43

The commentator merely chooses to

disregard the accommodation already identified by the Supreme
Court.
The authors of an article describing the doctrine of fair
use as "the biographer's bane" condemn the severe limitations on
copying unpublished works protected by copyright as a "dangerous
rule of interpretation. " 44
"unpublished works .

.

They refer to language in Salinger

. normally enjoy complete protection

against copying any protected expression" 45 -- as an
"overstatement 1146 of the Harper

&

Row standard:
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"[u]nder

ordinary circumstances, the author's right to control the first
public appearance of his undisseminated expression will outweigh
a claim of fair use .. 1147

It is difficult to discern how the

language in Salinger is anything other than a restatement of the
standard in Harper & Row.

The same authors find much to

criticize in New Era, finding that it "ignore[s] the explicit
congressional mandate that the equities must be flexibly balanced
case by case 1148 in favor of elevating the single fact of
unpublished status "to an almost insurmountable obstacle to a
successful fair use defense."~

But there is nothing in New Era

to indicate that the congressional mandate to apply the fair use
factors in the case of unpublished works is to be ignored.

There

is merely a reiteration of the principle that the unpublished
nature of a work is to weigh heavily in the balance and a
faithful adherence to the "under ordinary circumstances" language
employed by the Supreme Court.
-~~-- sJ1re~"''"'6:1'\""""'e*a·~~9'~~~~"'~'a:yf'""''"'tr&«"·de~'"""orte

"·Gemmen:ta.to.;,;,r. ,that"
.publ,i~llin(j

'"fht·±ographers ··are·now .. v:ir·=~HiHl:-l·±Y""fi::H::e&l·l:lded···· from

1

con:vincinq1 ···crit·.±cal··portra±ts···"·backed···up·· by... limited

·use . . 0£.. fthe. subject rs unpublishea, writings....t.o .....r.ebu,t..... a.,t.OQ·.,polishe(i;

·publ~i~kpeJ;sona. ". 50
say, as does

It simply is an incorrect statement of law to

~~same~commentator,

that we have come to a point

"where property rights -- albeit intellectual property rights
em.bodied in the Copyright Act, which protects the manner of

11

expression of ideas or facts, takes precedence over the First
Amendment, which prevents the monopolization or privatization of
facts or ideas." 51

The Supreme Court has held specifically that

the protections of the First Amendment are "already embodied in
the Copyright Act's distinction between copyrightable expression
and uncopyrightable facts and ideas." 52

As to the fair use

doctrine in particular, the commentator candidly concedes as
accurate the statement that the '"doctrine encompasses all claims
of first amendment in the copyright field,'" 53
with it.

but disagrees

Even so, it is difficult to know why he considers that

a "chill wind now blows through . . . editorial offices," 54 in
view of the unlimited right to use facts and ideas, published and
unpublished, copyrighted and uncopyrighted; the limited right to
use copyrighted, published material, and the severely limited
right to use copyrighted, unpublished material.

My thesis is

that the delicate balance between the public interest and private
rights should be restored by a return to earlier law through the
total elimination of the right to the fair use of material that
is unpublished or undisseminated.
An understanding of this thesis requies an examination of

the policy underlying copyright law and the doctrine of fair use.
The Supreme Court teaches that the purpose of copyright is to
stimulate creativity for the public good through the incentive of
a fair return for an author's labor. 55

12

The concept of advancing

the public welfare by encouraging individual effort through
personal gain is said to drive the Patents and Copyrights clause
of the Constitution. 56

The Supreme Court reminds us "that the

Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free
expression.

By establishing a marketable right to the use of

one's expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to
create and disseminate ideas." 57

The fair use doctrine,

described as an "equitable rule of reason, 1158 was developed by
the courts to provide some elasticity in situations where the
copyright law might tend to inhibit authors from creating new
works by building on older works.

Strict application of

copyright in such situations would defeat incremental progress,
to the detriment of the public good.

My colleague, Judge Posner,

suggests that Shakespeare, who was known to borrow plot,
character and actual language from existing works, might be
stifled by our copyright law. 59

Positing a return to the theory

of creative imitation of Shakespeare's day, Judge Posner notes
that the extensive expansion of fair use that would be required
not only would be difficult to define but would very adversely
affect the author whose work was used. 60

Although he finds

thriving literature before there was such a thing as copyright,
the reasons he gives for the phenomenon -- the low cost of
writing, non-monetary rewards, and the high cost of copying
have little relevance to modern times. 61

13

·Ne>t·· unex:pectedlyr · ·an
.advocated that ncongress
. and disapprov.ai.. of....the.

L;e!(;;;t::H1ibc······ ..t.u·:1.:.·:r..1;-1t;11·o··•f·······J~t5·"""1:1::"1>.1:·.L·.1:·.;.1o;·"'·*""'·~·

·w.itft.,,·""t·he··Nation case1whieh···devia'E·e· so far from
0

and."..nistory a.re. and necessarilyought. to.. be writtenr"
Nat.;i.QJ;l,~..s...

·

pre~..

speeific· proposal was... :t;g... amend···the ·Copyriqh:t Acrt"···t.0·"'

that· !'unpublished material shall ·be ·t.reated the .same

.as· :published works have heretofore

bee·n t:re·ated" for fair·· ase

.pur~~-.-.-Apparently, it would make no di.fference to The".
Na·tio.n whethe.r or not the unpublished

material~·

was stolen..

The..

·statu.tory amendment proposed in t:he· editorial, contrary; tG its
purpo;i;;ted goal, would not serve the publicpurpGsebecause
would .. not encourage. the efforts of authors·.

That an unpublished.,,..

undii!Mi eminated, copyrighted work is of· hi.storical signifieance,,,
1

an~"·""'·Eieserving of unfettered publ.:ie diseussion.! 64 does not mean
1

•

that····.,:.h·he public may take from that··.,woJ!ilf:

whateve~·"'··i·t···w...i.L.•;;L:'".:1!~··111··,,.··

As has been demonstrated, the present "open window" for fair
use of unpublished material has given rise to much uncertainty.
It allows for the exploitation of stolen text.

It has spawned

proposals for fair use analysis under market theory guidelines, 65
redevelopment of the fair use doctrine predicated in part on a
utopian theory, 66

and evaluation of the unpublished nature of

14

the work on a fact/fiction scale. 67

A rule that would disallow

the exploitation of purloined work, dispel the uncertainty
attributable to the open window, and eliminate the need to revise
the doctrine of fair use as applied to unpublished works is a
rule that prohibits absolutely any copying of unpublished or
undisseminated works.
It cannot be gainsaid that an author should have the right
eft&.-4;h~~~y

to

"'ft<:~ft~~""'~J~.•.g.~..-~~~~·fit:S.,

his or her work prior to

revise or discard

publication--~~~~~~~~~~-~ea~~ldr.J1:et~·~a·feo

public dissemination
Implicated
in these rights are notions of privacy, 68 freedom to refrain from
speaking, 69 and an author's control of his or her own material. 70
If information can be considered property under certain
circumstances, 71 an unpublished and undisseminated manuscript,
duly copyrighted, should be considered the property of the author
and subject to the protection of the law. 72
To the argument that the copying of unpublished material
must be allowed for reasons of public health, safety or
welfare, 73 the short response is that copyright protection does
not extend to any fact or idea embodied in a copyrighted work. 74
To the assertion that the retention of unpublished, copyrighted
papers for 50 to 100 years, 75 immune from fair use, is at "crosspurposes" with the Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 76 the
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answer is the same.

The freedom of access to facts and ideas is

the history of democracy.
property

The right of ownership in intellectual

quite another thing.

Interestingly enough, it

appears that an author whose work is protected under the
recently-ratified Berne Convention 77 is entitled to protection
from any use of an unpublished work. 78

.-1c""'~"'"'*"'f~·· ·s·:Aa'±·•±"···ee"·uperm·:i::·s·s~·i,,:B·le,. . . t;o.Nmake····
... qu9't::at±ons··· f:£'!om····a work··which·· al:Eeady··has .be&n
.n1ad~.av.a.iiahl.,e."".to .... the-· publie·r·~rovided····tha t
tae.ir making····is compatible· with faiP.pr·act~cer·~ ai;.d. their ex.tent does not e~f eed
· tha:t'" Just.1 f ied by the· purpose· . . . .

,.1B~Li~hed-mate:z;. i,. a.1"' •. w..o:u.l4"·· se.e~·"·:ti~·····Be···e·He·±uded······f·~om.. .;,J 1 ··f·ai~··

-p.J;actice.,.". and a violation of·
,an~~~o.;t.

·SUGft·

~·mo:raJ,•Y•·1!'.'igh1P...sJL

ma¥ .be.. impLicated.

materiai·: BQ

My thesis accounts for the concern of scholars that a denial
of fair use for unpublished works would be "most inappropriate
for the great majority of letters and memorabilia whose authors
are no longer alive. 1181

It does so by allowing use of the

factual content of letters and memorabilia.~

It also does so by

deeming letters to be voluntarily disseminated to the public when
they are received by the addressees.

The generally accepted

concept that the author of the letter retains the ownership of
the intellectual property, while the recipient acquires ownership
of the physical property, allows public display of the letter by
the recipient. 83

There is no great leap in logic to consider
16

that, in writing and sending letters, authors have agreed to a
dissemination of their correspondence to the public.

Voluntary

public dissemination was, of course, the same as publication for
the purpose of losing the common law copyright protection that
applied to unpublished matter under the old dual system of
copyright. 84

Historians, as well as authors, scholars,

journalists and researchers should have no quarre1 85 with a rule
that permits the fair use of copyrighted letters, wherever such
letters are found, to the same extent that they are afforded fair
use of published or publicly disseminated matter.
The Framers of our Constitution long ago foresaw the need to
maintain balances in the republic they created: the balance
between individual rights and public needs; the balance of
authority between state and national governments; and the balance
entailed in the separation of powers in the federal government.
In the area of intellectual property, they foresaw a need to
maintain a balance between the rights of authors and inventors
and the rights of society. 86

They therefore empowered the

Congress to establish and maintain that balance by assuring that
writers and inventors have exclusive rights, but only for a
limited time, in their writings and discoveries.

The balance

contemplated cannot be established or maintained unless Congress
affords to authors the assurance that their copyrighted work
cannot be used in any manner whatsoever prior to publication or
voluntary and public disseminati_on.
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EXPLOITING STOLEN TEXT:

FAIR USE OR FOUL PLAY?*

Roger J. Miner**

The doctrine of fair use in copyright law presently permits
the exploitation of unpublished, copyrighted text stolen from an
author or one in lawful possession.

This anomaly in the law is a

creature of the Copyright Act 1 and should be eliminated by
appropriate statutory amendment.

The outright theft of

intellectual property ought not to be condoned by Congress.

In

any case where an author has not published or publicly
disseminated his or her copyrighted material, there simply is no
reason to allow the use of that material without the author's
consent.
In his Commentaries on the Laws of England, Sir William
Blackstone described the rights of authors in their original
compositions as a "species of property grounded in labour and
invention." 2

The rule in 1766 England, according to Blackstone,

was that
(w]hen a man by the exertion of his
rational powers has produced an
original work, he has clearly a
right to dispose of that identical
work as he pleases, and any attempt
to take it from him, or vary the
disposition he has made of it, is
an invasi~n of his right of
property.
Copyright was recognized in the common law as well as by the
Statute of Anne, 4 which, according to Blackstone, provided

"additional penalties 115 to protect the property of authors and
their assigns for a term of years.

On the equity side, courts of

chancery granted injunctions prohibiting the invasion of authors'
property rights. 6

It is interesting to note that Blackstone, in

examining the law of larceny, found that "when property is
established, .

any violation of that property is subject to

be punished by the laws of society." 7
The right to make some reasonable use of published,
copyrighted material long has been recognized in the English
cases.

"Fair abridgement," as it then was called, was permitted

early on, despite the difficulties experienced by courts in
coping with the concept. 8

However, the common law rights of

authors to control first publication always were considered
separate and distinct from any rules pertaining to statutory
copyright, including the doctrine of fair use.

In affirming an

injunction against the publication of a catalogue of etchings
made by Prince Albert and Queen Victoria and obtained without
their consent, the Lord Chancellor held that "abridgements,
translations, extracts, and criticisms of public works . . . all
depend upon the extent of right[s] under the acts respecting
copyright, and have no analogy to the exclusive rights in the
author of unpublished compositions, which depend entirely upon
the common law right of property.

2
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In the United States, Congress first exercised its
constitutional authority to "secur(e] for limited Times to
Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective Writings" 10
when it enacted the first copyright statute in 1790. 11

In Folsom

v. Marsh, 12 Justice Story formulated the first definitive
statement on fair use in American copyright law.

The case

involved a claim of infringement in the copying of certain
letters of George Washington in a two-volume work on Washington
written by Rev. Charles Upham.

The letters were copied from the

twelve-volume work of Jared Sparks, who originally edited,
copyrighted and published them.

Sparks and Chief Justice

Marshall had obtained the letters from Justice Bushrod
Washington, nephew of the first president.

In his opinion,

Justice Story discussed the justifiable uses of copyrighted works
and developed some factors to be considered in determining
whether there has been an infringement.

Those factors -- the

nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value
of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may
prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the
objects of the original work 13 -- were to be echoed in the
Copyright Act of 1976. 14
The distinction between common law and statutory copyright
protection was carried over to American law from the law of
England . 15

Common law copyright attached to a work from creation

3

to publication or dissemination, and was enforceable in the state
courts. 16

As was true under British law, the defense of fair use

was not considered applicable to unpublished material. 17
1976 Copyright Act changed all that.

Or so it seemed.

The
Common

law copyright, often referred to as the right of first
publication, was preempted by the new statute. 18

The doctrine of

fair use was codified and made applicable for the first time to
all copyrighted work, published and unpublished, without
distinction..
work . .

According to the Act, "fair use of a copyrighted

. for purposes such as criticism, comment, news

reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright. 1119

In determining whether the use

made of a work in a particular case is fair, courts are
constrained to consider four factors:

purpose and character of

the use; nature of the copyrighted work; amount and
substantiality of the portion used; and effect of the use on the
potential market for the copyrighted work. 20
A persuasive case is made in the leading treatise on fair
use for the proposition "that Congress intended to continue the
common law prohibition against fair use of unpublished but not
voluntarily disseminated works. 1121

There is, of course, no

specific statutory language supporting the proposition, which is
founded in a review of the legislative history of the 1976 Act.
The legislative history referred to is derived from the reports

4

several committees of Congress, including one expressing a
congressional intent to "restate the present judicial doctrine of
fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way. "22
The treatise refers to this and other evidence as providing
support for the notion that the fair use doctrine is intended to
apply only to unpublished works that are publicly disseminated,
the same as at common law. 23

Apparently, public dissemination is

thought to involve a deliberate choice to make a work available
to others, short of actual publication.

The public performance

of unpublished plays and an author's delivery of an unpublished
manuscript to a critic are given as examples of voluntary
dissemination. 24

Publication is defined by statute as "the

distribution of copies . . . of a work to the public" as well as
"[t]he offering to distribute copies . . . to a group of persons
for purposes of further distribution, public performance, or
public display . .

A public performance or display of a work

does not of itself constitute publication." 25

The distinction

between publication and public dissemination is very slight
indeed.
In Harpe~ & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 26
the Supreme Court was presented with a clear opportunity to
eliminate unpublished works from the reach of fair use.

That it

did not do so was attributable solely to the language of the
Copyright Act.

Unquestioned in Harper & Row was the trial

5

court's finding that the defendant "knowingly exploited a
purloined manuscript." 27

The manuscript in question was, of

course, the memoirs of President Ford.

Excerpts of the memoirs

were scheduled to appear in Time magazine one week before the
full length book was to be distributed by the plaintiff
publishing house.

Before either scheduled event transpired,

simple theft allowed the defendant to print and distribute the
words of President Ford, describing the pardon of Richard Nixon,
in its publication.

In reversing the Second Circuit Court of

Appeals and holding the plaintiff entitled to damages, the Court
concluded "that the unpublished nature of a work is '[a] key,
though not necessarily determinative, factor' tending to negate a
defense of fair use. " 28

Al though the Court analyzed the facts of

the case in terms of the four statutory fair use factors, it held
that "[u]nder ordinary circumstances, the author's right to
control the first public appearance of his undisseminated
expression will outweigh a claim of fair use. 029
the vague and undefined phrase,

I suggest that

"under ordinary circumstances,"

leaves open a window that should be closed by Congress.

The

window is open only because the Copyright Act presently

no

distinction for fair use purposes between copyrighted material
that is published or disseminated and copyrighted material that
is unpublished or undisseminated.
thief may enter.

6

It is a window through which a

In the wake of Harper & Row, the courts have been faced with
some thorny problems in deciding whether various uses of
unpublished, copyrighted material were used fairly within the
intendment of the Copyright Act.

For example, in Salinger v.

Random House, Inc., 30 a case involving the copying of letters of
J.D. Salinger by a biographer who gained access to the letters by
promising not to copy them, the appeals court panel puzzled over
the "ambiguity arising from the Supreme Court's observation that
'the scope of fair use is narrower with respect to unpublished
works.'" 31

The conclusion was that the Court meant it was less

likely that fair use would apply to unpublished than published
matter, and not merely that a lesser quantity of material may be
copied in the case of unpublished matter.

It is interesting to

note that at least some of the biographer's copying was motivated
by a desire to avoid writing what he called "pedestrian
sentence[s]. " 32

If you can lift the word images and stylistic

devices of J.D. Salinger, why bother creating your own?
The extensive use of an unpublished paper "purloined from
the Princeton library 1133 presented a District Judge with yet
another twist in the defense of fair use.

A copy of the

dealing with the Pahlevi restoration in Iran, arrived at the
library as part of the files of Allen Dulles, to whom it was sent
by the author.

Researchers at the library were afforded notice

of possible liability for copyright infringement and agreed that

7

permission to reproduce was required.

The user claimed that he

was entitled to copy large parts of the author's paper in order
to provide his book with an "air of authenticity" and "full
flavor." 34

He contended also that the "ordinary circumstances"

rule did not apply because the paper copied was fact rather than
fiction, the author of the paper had given copies to certain
persons, and the paper and the book were designed to serve
different purposes. 35

The district court rejected all these

contentions, applied the statutory fair use factors and found the
user liable for infringement.
An action to enjoin the publication of the biography of L.
Ron Hubbard, deceased founder of the Church of Scientology,
presented another occasion for an attempt to define further the
imprecise parameters of the doctrine of fair use as it pertains
to unpublished material.

The material was the product of the pen

of Hubbard himself, and the unpublished writings in question, a
certain diary in particular, were almost certainly acquired from
the Church of Scientology by misappropriation or conversion. 36
Although the district court ultimately decided to award damages
for infringement, it accepted the infringer's contention that
there is greater justification in using unpublished work to make
a point about the character of the work's author (as was the case
in the Hubbard biography) than to display the distinctiveness of
a writing style (as was the case in the Salinger biography).

8

In dictum, the panel majority of the appeals court found the
distinction between use to enliven text and use to communicate
certain traits of character "unnecessary and unwarranted:" the
biography clearly was a work of criticism, scholarship or
research, the purpose of use factor therefore weighed in favor of
the copier, and this distinction was considered superfluous. 37
The dissent from denial of in bane consideration in the case
found significance in the fact that the Supreme Court never has
expressly rejected the "distinction between copying expression to
enliven the copier's prose and doing so where necessary to report
a fact accurately and fairly. " 38

As the author of the panel

majority opinion and the opinion concurring in the denial of
rehearing in bane, I continue to "question whether judges, rather
than literary critics, should decide whether literary material is
used to enliven text or demonstrate truth." 39

In my opinion,

"[i]t is far too easy for one author to use another author's work
on the pretext it is copied for the latter purpose rather than
the former. 1140

The issue is not yet definitely resolved in the

Second Circuit because affirmance of the judgment of the district
court in the case, New Era Publications v. Henry Holt & Co., was
based on laches, rather than on the type of use to which the
converted material was put. 41
Certain elements of the intellectual property bar hold the
firm belief that the window of fair use should be opened even

9

wider than permitted by Harper & Row for access to unpublished
and undisseminated material.

These elements apparently are not

at all offended by the notion of exploiting a manuscript pilfered
by a burglar from an author's locked desk drawer, provided the
exploitation furthers a just and worthy cause.

That federal

judges are intended to decide what causes are good and just
should be a matter of some concern.

Many critics base their

positions on First Amendment arguments.

One commentator has

written that "[t]he nature of the accomodation [sic] between
copyright principles and First Amendment principles remains to be
drafted. 1142

Yet the Supreme Court in Harper

&

Row noted "that

copyright's idea/expression dichotomy 'strike[s] a definitional
balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by
permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an
author's expression. '" 43

The commentator merely chooses to

disregard the accommodation already identified by the Supreme
Court.
The authors of an article describing the doctrine of fair
use as "the biographer's bane" condemn the severe limitations on
copying unpublished works protected by copyright as a Hdangerous
rule of interpretation.""
"unpublished works .

.

They refer to language in Salinger

. normally enjoy complete protection

against copying any protected expression" 45 -- as an
"overstatement 1146 of the Harper & Row standard:
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"[u]nder

ordinary circumstances, the author's right to control the first
public appearance of his undisseminated expression will outweigh
a claim of fair use." 47

It is difficult to discern how the

language in Salinger is anything other than a restatement of the
standard in Harper & Row.

The same authors find much to

criticize in New Era, finding that it "ignore[s] the explicit
congressional mandate that the equities must be flexibly balanced
case by case" 48 in favor of elevating the single fact of
unpublished status "to an almost insurmountable obstacle to a
successful fair use defense. 1149

But there is nothing in New Era

to indicate that the congressional mandate to apply the fair use
factors in the case of unpublished works is to be ignored.

There

is merely a reiteration of the principle that the unpublished
nature of a work is to weigh heavily in the balance and a
faithful adherence to the "under ordinary circumstances" language
employed by the Supreme Court.
It is surely an exaggeration to say, as does one
commentator, that "[b]iographers are now virtually precluded from
publishing convincing, critical portraits backed up by limited
use of the subject's !!_!!Published writings to rebut a too polished
public persona. " 50

It simply is an incorrect statement of law to

say, as does the same commentator, that we have come to a point
"where property rights -- albeit intellectual property rights
embodied in the Copyright Act, which protects the manner of
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expression of ideas or facts, takes precedence over the First
Amendment, which prevents the monopolization or privatization of
facts or ideas." 51

The Supreme Court has held specifically that

the protections of the First Amendment are "already embodied in
the Copyright Act's distinction between copyrightable expression
and uncopyrightable facts and ideas." 52

As to the fair use

doctrine in particular, the commentator candidly concedes as
accurate the statement that the "'doctrine encompasses all claims
of first amendment in the copyright field,'" 53
with it.

but disagrees

Even so, it is difficult to know why he considers that

a "chill wind now blows through . . . editorial offices, 1154 in
view of the unlimited right to use facts and ideas, published and
unpublished, copyrighted and uncopyrighted; the limited right to
use copyrighted, published material, and the severely limited
right to use copyrighted, unpublished material.

My thesis is

that the delicate balance between the public interest and private
rights should be restored by a return to earlier law through the
total elimination of the right to the fair use of material that
is unpublished or undisseminated.

An understanding of this thesis requies an examination of
the policy underlying copyright law and the doctrine of fair use.
The Supreme Court teaches that the purpose of copyright is to
stimulate creativity for the public good through the incentive of
a fair return for an author's labor. 55
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The concept of advancing

the public wel

by encouraging individual effort through

personal gain is said to drive the Patents and Copyrights clause
of the Constitution. 56

The Supreme Court reminds us "that the

Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free
expression.

By establishing a marketable right to the use of

one's expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to
create and disseminate ideas .. " 57

The fair use doctrine,

described as an "equitable rule of reason," 58 was developed by
the courts to provide some elasticity in situations where the
copyright law might tend to inhibit authors from creating new
works by building on older works.

Strict application of

copyright in such situations would defeat incremental progress,
to the detriment of the public good.

My colleague, Judge Posner,

suggests that Shakespeare, who was known to borrow plot,
character and actual language from existing works, might be
stifled by our copyright law. 59

Positing a return to the theory

of creative imitation of Shakespeare's day, Judge Posner notes
that the extensive expansion of fair use that would be required
not only would be difficult to define but would very adversely
affect the author whose work was usect. 60

Although he finds

thriving literature before there was such a thing as copyright,
the reasons he gives for the phenomenon -- the low cost of
writing, non-monetary rewards, and the high cost of copying
have little relevance to modern times. 61
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It is difficult to understand how the expansion of fair use
of unpublished works that some espouse would serve the purpose of
present-day copyright law.

Not unexpectedly, an editorial in The

Nation recently advocated that "Congress should indicate its
displeasure with and disapproval of the recent rulings, beginning
with the Nation case, which deviate so far from the way politics
and history are and necessarily ought to be written. " 62

The

Nation's specific proposal was to amend the Copyright Act to
provide that "unpublished material shall be treated the same way
as published works have heretofore been treated" for fair use
purposes. 63

Apparently, it would make no difference to The

Nation whether or not the unpublished material was stolen.

The

statutory amendment proposed in the editorial, contrary to its
purported goal, would not serve the public purpose because it
would not encourage the efforts of authors.

That an unpublished,

undisseminated, copyrighted work is of historical significance
and "deserving of unfettered public discussion" 64 does not mean
that the public may take from that work whatever it will.
As has been demonstrated, the present "open window" for fair
use of unpublished material has given rise to much uncertainty.
It allows for the exploitation of stolen text.

It has spawned

proposals for fair use analysis under market theory guidelines,
redevelopment of the fair use doctrine predicated in part on a
utopian theory, 66

and evaluation of the unpublished nature of
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65

the work on a fact/fiction scale. 67

A rule that would disallow

the exploitation of purloined work, dispel the uncertainty
attributable to the open window, and eliminate the need to revise
the doctrine of fair use as applied to unpublished works is a
rule that prohibits absolutely any copying of unpublished or
undisseminated works.
It cannot be gainsaid that an author should have the right
and the opportunity to hone, polish, refine, revise or discard
his or her work prior to publication.

The author should also

have the right to withhold the work from public dissemination
just as long as he or she deems it proper to do so.

Implicated

in these rights are notions of privacy, 68 freedom to refrain from
speaking, 69 and an author's control of his or her own material. 70
If information can be considered property under certain
circumstances, 71 an unpublished and undisseminated manuscript,
duly copyrighted, should be considered the property of the author
and subject to the protection of the law. 72
To the argument that the copying of unpublished material
must be allowed for reasons of public health, safety or
welfare, 73 the short response is that copyright protection does
not extend to any fact or idea embodied in a copyrighted work. 74
To the assertion that the retention of unpublished, copyrighted
papers for 50 to 100 years, 75 immune from fair use, is at "crosspurposes" with the Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 76 the
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answer is the same.

The freedom of access to facts and ideas is

the history of democracy.

The right of ownership in intellectual

property is quite another thing.

Interestingly enough, it

appears that an author whose work is protected under the
recently-ratified Berne Convention 77 is entitled to protection
from any use of an unpublished work. 78

The Convention provides

that:
[i]t shall be permissible to make
quotations from a work which already has been
made available to the public, provided that
their making is compatible with fair
practice, and their extent does not e~feed
that justified by the purpose . . . .
Unpublished material would seem to be excluded from "fair
practice," and a violation of "moral rights" may be implicated in
any use of such materia1. 80
My thesis accounts for the concern of scholars that a denial
of fair use for unpublished works would be "most inappropriate
for the great majority of letters and memorabilia whose authors
are no longer alive." 81

It does so by allowing use of the

factual content of letters and memorabilia. 82

It also does so by

deeming letters to be voluntarily disseminated to the public when
they are received by the addressees.

The generally accepted

concept that the author of the letter retains the ownership of
the intellectual property, while the recipient acquires ownership
of the physical property, allows public display of the letter by
the recipient. 83

There is no great leap in logic to consider
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that, in writing and sending letters, authors have agreed to a
dissemination of their correspondence to the public.

Voluntary

public dissemination was, of course, the same as publication for
the purpose of losing the common law copyright protection that
applied to unpublished matter under the old dual system of
copyright. 84

Historians, as well as authors, scholars,

journalists and researchers should have no quarre1 85 with a rule
that permits the fair use of copyrighted letters, wherever such
letters are found, to the same extent that they are afforded fair
use of published or publicly disseminated matter.
The Framers of our Constitution long ago foresaw the need to
maintain balances in the republic they created: the balance
between individual rights and public needs; the balance of
authority between state and national governments; and the balance
entailed in the separation of powers in the federal government.
In the area of intellectual property, they foresaw a need to
maintain a balance between the rights of authors and inventors
and the rights of society. 86

They therefore empowered the

Congress to establish and maintain that balance by assuring that
writers and inventors have exclusive rights, but only for a
limited time, in their writings and discoveries.

The balance

contemplated cannot be established or maintained unless Congress
affords to authors the assurance that their copyrighted work
cannot be used in any manner whatsoever prior to publication or
voluntary and public dissemination.
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